The hard problem of consciousness

Notes

Claim

The hard problem of consciousness is to explain and understand subjective experiences—what it means to be conscious.

Explanation

The "easy" problem is to understand what is a reflex, how we see objects, etc. The hard problem is to explain what it means to be conscious. It is unclear, even if we see all neurons firing, where the subjective experience of seeing red comes from, or "what it's like to be a bat".

This is linked to the qualia—knowing red and seeing red is different.

Why it matters

Examples

Mary's Room makes it concrete: a scientist who has mastered every physical fact about color vision, but has only ever seen black and white, seems to learn something new the moment she steps outside and sees red for the first time Mary's Room.

Supporters

Panpsychism is one attempt to dissolve this gap by making consciousness fundamental to nature instead of something that emerges from matter Consciousness is a fundamental property of nature. The same asymmetry shows up elsewhere too—some knowledge seems reachable only by having the experience, never by being told about it Some knowledge requires direct experience to fully understand.

Opposers

Attempts to quantify subjective states—asking someone to rate their happiness from 1 to 10—quietly assume experience is comparable and measurable, sidestepping the exact gap this claim points at Utility quantifies measurable benefits and guides rational decisions.

Open questions

Is consciousness something that exists in the single neuron (perhaps leads to Consciousness is a fundamental property of nature)? Maybe it is something non-material dualism? Or maybe consciousness is a lie that we tell ourselves, like free will, and we are all just robots, destined to live in a world of Everything is a result of prior causes?

Visual